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CONTENTS 
This paper is divided into six principal chapters. As far as possible each chapter has been made 
pe1tinent to a particular topic under discussion. 
Chapter Two provides an overview of the machinery provided by Section 311 the Companies 
Act 61, of 1973, as amended. 
Chapter Three focuses on the Primacy of Assessed Loss and the General Principles Regarding 
Section 20. 
Following on discussion on section 20(1)(a)(ii), Chapter Four tackles the vexed problem of 
Preserving the Assessed Loss, and various innovative schemes available to circumvent the 
obstacles placed by the applicable provision. 
Chapter Five examines income tax pitfalls of Trafficking Assessed Losses of Companies, the 
mechanics of Section 103(2). And Conshu (Pty) Ltd v CIR (hereafter referred to as "the 
Conshu case") is revisited. 
The Concluding Chapter sums up all the questions that have greatly exercised the Scheme of 
Arrangement industry, by examining the position in terms oflegal and tax efficacy and to 
identify Commissioner oflnland Revenue's attitudes as known in the present time as wells as 
· to give some positive guidance on how matters may possibly be looked at for the foreseeable 
future until the views of both the Commissioner of Revenue and the Appellate Division are 
more clearly defined and better known. 
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CHAPTERl 
THE ASSESSED LOSS THE DRIVING FORCE BEHIND SCHEMES OF 
ARRANGEMENTS AND COMPROMISE UNDER SECTION 311 OF THE 
COMPANIES ACT 
1.1 Purpose and Scope 
The desire of virtually all taxpayers today is to find some means of minimizing their taxes. The 
search for tax shelters by taxpayers is relentless. 
Tax considerations are hallmarks of scheme of arrangements and compromise carried out in 
terms of s3 11 of the Companies Act. The scheme of arrangements gained popularity during 
the sanctions era as a tax saving device. Broadly speaking, s311 schemes have been employed 
as a relatively inexpensive method of acquiring financially distressed company being wound up 
with one of the most alluring commodities from tax point of view - a large balance of assessed 
loss to generate tax-sheltered income. 
The retention of assessed loss is paramount concern of proposers of s 311 scheme of 
arrangements and compromise with creditors. It is, therefore, a matter of considerable import 
that an insolvent company's assessed loss remain largely intact. And when it comes to 
structuring an arrangement or compromise, the choice of scheme is even more crucial 
es;>ecially if the objective is the set-off of assessed loss against current income. 
The assessed loss has been described as the leit motif behind the beneficial use of statutory 
corporate re-organization facilitated by s 3 11 of the Companies Act. 
To the extent that schemes of arrangements and compromise are used to obtain substantial tax 
savings, the taxpayers make very considerable inroads into the fiscus. As soon as one starts to 
engage in s3 l l schemes of arrangements and compromise, one is liable to draw bit of attention 
to trafficking in assessed losses of companies and to provoke the Commissioner of Inland 
Revenue into a counter-attack. 
2 
The opportunity to get assessed loss set-off against income is governed by two complimentary 
provisions, namely, sections 20 and 103(2). Section 20(1) results in a forfeiture or 
sterilization of assessed where there was mercantile abstinence on the part of the company. 
While section 20(1)(a)(ii) provides that the balance of assessed loss shall be reduced by the 
amount or value of any benefit received by or accruing to a person resulting from a concession 
granted by or compromise made with his creditors whereby his liabilities to them have been 
extinguished, provided that such liabilities arose in the course of trade. 
Further disqualification is provided by s103(2) which is specifically aimed at restricting 
trafficking in assessed losses of companies. The tax efficacy of s311 schemes can be easily 
overshadowed by adverse tax treatment under aforementioned provisions. 
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CHAPTER2 
SCHEMES OF ARRANGEMENTS AND COMPROMISE CARRIED OUT IN 
TERMS OF SECTION 311 OF THE COMPANIES ACT 61, 1973 
2.1 Background 
A method of acquiring the shares in a company via what is commonly referred to as a "scheme 
of arrangement" carried out in terms of s311 of the Companies Act 61, 73, as amended is a 
familiar one. It is a procedure designed to facilitate compromises and arrangement between 
companies, their members and creditors. Because of its origin, nature and sphere of application, 
wl1ere normal mechanisms are available, the scheme of arrangement is inappropriate. 
The raison e 'etre of s311 machinery has been described in the clearest terms in Australian 
Company Law ed by Patterson and Edrie: 
"The section is intended to provide machinery (i) for the overcoming the impossibility of 
obtaining the individual consent of every member of the class intended to be bound thereby; (ii) 
to prevent in appropriate circumstances a minority of class, members frustrating a beneficial 
scheme .... "1 
And concisely and felitously described in Ex parte Lomati Landgoed (Edms) Bpk: 
"The purpose of section 311 of the Companies Act can be concisely put as being an attempted 
solution of the problem attendant upon obtaining an agreement in the case of a large number 
(!/,widely distributed people who must be contacted with view to negotiating the same agreement 
with each one. Section 311 is therefore particularly applicable where it is impossible or difficult 
to approach everybody individually with a view to submission of the offer."2 
In a sense, therefore, the machinery is created to bind dissenting recalcitrant minority to the 
agreement between the company and majority of members or creditors. Consequently a proposer 
of scheme of arrangement and compromise must surely be acquainted with complex and 
multifarious procedure prescribed by the Companies Act3. 
The scheme of arrangement, generally, comes ihto play when a company cannot pay its creditors 
ard a compromise is proposed and has to be sanctioned by the Court. Faced with a choice of a 
reduced pay-out of their claims and attendant costs of liquidation ( or even merciless ravages of 
inflation), creditors of the company will be heavily inclined to the former. An insolvent company's 
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ar.f;umulated assessed loss is the major impetus and incentive for third parties seeking to initiate 
section 3 i 1 schemes of arrangements and compromises with company, its members and creditors. 
The Taxpayer sums up the position of a would-be acquirer of a company which enjoys an 
assessed loss for income tax purpose is as follows: 'he would wish to effect a compromise or 
arrangement between the company and its creditors to obtain the protection afforded by section 
311 of the Companies Act, yet he would wish to minimise an amount or benefit of any such 
compromise in order to preserve the company's assessed loss largely intact. ' 4 
An approach that might suggest itself as fruitful for discussing schemes of arrangements and 
compromise and seeking to explain the development in this area, or their absence is to pay 
h9_mage to the rather direct mandates of the relevant provision. 
2.2 Provisions of Section 311 of the Companies Act 
~The relevant part section provides as follows: 
311(1) "When any compromise or arrangement is proposed between a company and its creditors 
or any class of them or between a company and its members or any class of them, the court may 
, on the application of the company or any creditor or any member of the company being wound 
or, in the case of a company being wound up, of the liquidator, or if the company is subject to 
a judicial management order, of the judicial manager, order a meeting of the creditors or class 
of creditors, or of the members of the company or class of members (as the case may be) to be 
s1.ynmoned in such a manner as the court may direct 
(2) If the compromise or arrangement is agreed to by -
(a) a majority in number representing three-fourths in value of the creditors or class of 
creditors; or 
(b) a majority representing three-fourths of the votes exercisable by the members or class of 
members, 
(as the case may be) present and voting either in person or by proxy at the meeting, such 
compromise or agreement shall, if sanctioned by the court, be binding on all the creditors or 
class of creditors, or on members or class of members (as the case may be) and also on the 
company or the liquidator if the company is being wound up or on the judicial manger if the 
company is subject to a judicial management order. 
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2.2.1 Meaning of Compromise and Arrangement 
The wording of s311 is not quite what one would expect, it does not provide precise 
definition of the terms "compromise or arrangement". We have, therefore, to rely on a 
number of judicial decisions. In Re NFU development Trust Ltd Brightman J gave the 
following definition: 
,~ "The word 'compromise ' implies some element of accommodation on each side. It is not apt J 
) to describe total surrender. A claimant who abandons his claim is not compromising it" ! 
right or modify undisputed rights where difficulty exist over their enforcement. Each party r· 
\ must give ground, but there must be a quid pro quo, not a gratuitous giving up of rights". 5 • 
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" Ab arrangement, by contrast, is a much wider concept, although similar to a compromise. An 
arrangement includes a reorganization of the share capital and persons of the company by the 
consolidation of shares of different classes or by both these methods. An arrangement implies 
some element of"give and take, some compensating advantage to the members or creditors 
concerned'6 
Accordingly there is no arrangement where its is proposed to confiscate rights of members 
without receiving compensating advantages. Such advantage must relate to some enforceable 
consideration for those concerned. In other words, the meaning of "rearrangement of rights" 
as used by the Legislature carries, at its core, survival of rights in different form and certainly 
nc,t disappearance7. Significantly, it is now established that section 311 is to be construed 
liberally and thus no narrow interpretation should be given to the expressions "compromise or 
arrangement"8. 
2.2.2 Meaning of Class of Creditors 
Once an applicant decides to propose an arrangement, it obviously becomes vital to determine 
precisely what class of members or creditors of the company should be made parties to the 
proposed scheme. The word "class" is not defined, but guidance may be obtained from 
Sovereign Life Assurance Co v Dodd, where Bowen J indicated that the meaning of class 
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\should be confined to "those persons whose rights are not dissimilar as to make it impossible 
~or them to consult together with a view to their common interests". 9 
The matter about which test to apply when determining what constitutes a "class" has now 
been rested. Creditors or members belong to the same class when their "rights are not so 
·' 
dissimilar as to make it impossible for them consult with a view to their common interests. It is 
now accepted that the test of commonality of rights is the proper one. 
2.2.3 The importance attached to the role of the company 
As we shall presently see, the South African Courts have at various stage sought to elevate the 
role of the company in the scheme of arrangement process. Only recently has some 
reconciliation effected. Consequently it has long been a controversial whether an insolvent 
company should be· play an active role in the process leading up to the court sanctioning the 
scheme. By contrast, the English Court have attached less importance to the role of the 
company in the scheme of arrangement10, thus an undertaking to register the transfer of shares 
is sufficient to comply with the jurisdictional requirements of the English Companies Act. 
In order to comply with the jurisdictional requirements of s 311, the arrangement must either 
be between the company and its members or the company and its creditors. Even if a proposed 
compromise or arrangement between the company and persons who are not members or 
creditors of the company may be beneficial both to the company and to its creditors or 
members, the court has no jurisdiction under s 311 both to order a meeting to consider a 
compromise or arrangement or sanction it. 
In the 1987 case of Ex parte Kaplan & Others NNO: In re Robin Consolidated Industries (Pty) 
Ltd11 (hereafter referred to as "the Robin case') Coetzee DJP obstinately refused to 
backdown, reiterating his view that, a court has no power to order a meeting to consider an 
arrangement which is not one between the company and its creditors. That did not mean that 
only these two parties could validly be involved in an arrangement without putting it beyond 
the pale for that reason. Thus it does not cease to be an arrangement merely because third 
persons must consent to perform certain duties, administrative or otherwise or are required to 
make finance or shares or other rights available to the company or members or creditors. 
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However, once, on proper construction of their contract, the third person is the true party to 
the arrangement to the exclusion of one of the others, it can no longer be said to be an 
arrangement between these latter two parties. That would destroy the privity between the 
company and creditors or members, which is a vital prerequisite for operation of section 311. 
He added: 
"One has to distinguish carefully between the basic content and the ancillary provisions of a 
scheme lest there is smuggled in, via the latter, something which is essentially part and 
parcel of its basic content and as .... of the arrangement and therefore merely ancillary to it 
must be exposed This is where, I believe, the reduction of scheme breaks down '"'12 
There is little doubt that the decision of Coetzee DJP constituted a catastrophe for many so-
called standard schemes and practitioners who then had been making an extremely lucrative 
living from the promotion, circularizing and implementation of many of these schemes. The 
partial cession scheme received a short shift at the hands of the Cape Court in Ex parte 
Millman & others NNO: In re Multi-bou (Pty) Ltdand others13 (hereafter referred to as "the 
Multi-bou case"). Berman J having considered the judgment in the Robin case, concluded that 
the ~cheme in question, was in truth and in fact nothing but the standard scheme in another 
form. He added, for sake of clarity, that it was a sham, a disguised or simulated transaction, 
structured to bear appearance and give the impression of an arrangement between the 
company and its creditors, when in substance it remained an arrangement between the 
proposer and the creditors. 
By contrast, the Natal Court in Ex parte Strydom NO: Central Plumbing14 Gudgement 
delivered by Friedman J who had sat with the Cape Court in Multi-bou gave a green light to 
the standard scheme. The learned judge stressed the fact that because a deemed, as opposed to 
actual, cession was present, the company was required to recognise a state of affairs which did 
not in fact exist. By implication the participation of the company is required, to give effect to 
the deemed cession. It has been correctly pointed out that is an inaccurate interpretation. 15 The 
section does not deem the dissenting creditors or members to have agreed to anything. It 
simply renders them bound. 
More recently, the Appellate Division16 has pronounced that, because s311 schemes are very 
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useful in the business world, the courts ought not to give a narrow construction to the 
provisions to a compromise or arrangement proposed between the company and its creditors, 
company's active role to be substantial. Section 311 schemes have served historically 
important purpose. 
2.2.4 Sanctioning the Scheme 
In exercising its discretion under s 311 the court is in effect wields the power of "life and 
death" over a company in relation to which compromise has been proposed 17. The sanctiohed 
scheme binds the company and all the creditors or members, or classes of either of them, the 
liquidator, if the company is being wound up, the judicial manager, if the company is under 
judicial management, and even outsiders. The only limitation placed on the scheme are from 
the general law. 
2.3 Miscellaneous Barriers 
2. 3 .1 Subordination of Claims 
The essence of subordination agreement is that a creditor usually a substantial one ( who is also 
a major shareholder of the company) agrees not to enforce or accept payment of his claim 
against the company until the occurrence of a particular event, such as the restoration of the 
company to solvency, or payment of all other creditors18 . This kind of agreement is often 
recommended by the insolvent company's auditor who otherwise would be required to report 
the fact that the company is trading in insolvent circumstances as material irregularity in terms 
of s20(5) of the Public Accountants and Auditors Act 80 of 1991. 
It becomes necessary therefore to assess the interface between subordination of claims and 
section 20(1 )(a)(ii). Where the quid pro quo for agreeing to subordinate the ceded claims is 
interest at a market related rates, even though the company has been given an extra lease 
through an extension of time within which to satisfy the claims, the liability have not been 
reduced. This means that all the essentalia for the application of s20(1)(a)(ii) are not present. 
In the absence of a quid pro quo, however, the court could still mle, consistent with prior 
precedents, that the company has benefitted as a result of extension of time within which to 
satisfy the claims, its liability have also been reduced. The rationale for invocation of section 
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20(l)(a)(ii) is that liabilities have also been reduced in that on subordination the company's 
liability is not to pay the face value of the ceded claims but the present value of the claims at 
the uncertain date upon solvency and the claims become enforceable. The potential reach of 
s20(l)(a)(ii) is still uncertain despite the benefit to the company because the calculation 
thereof is conspicuously imprecise. Where it was impossible, on what was submitted to the 
court, to quantify the benefit by reason of conversion of trade shares, section 20(1 )(a)(ii) does 
not apply. This was held by the Special Court in ITC 1613, 19 the primary reason being the 
absence in monetary terms and without prescribed formula on deeming provisions in the 
Income Tax Act, it was not possible to ascribe a monetary value to the benefit. Accordingly 
the company's assessed loss survived revenue attack largely intact. 
Recognizing the need for negating potential attack in terms of section 20(l)(a)(ii), Getz and 
Jooste20 have recently proposed a novel and provocative solution: make the subordinated 
claims to attract interest at market rates (such interest also be subordinated). The contention 
that subordination per se result in the application of s 20(1 )(a)(ii) is supported by the rational 
behind the provision. The assessed loss arises as a result of certain expenditure and allowances 
being deductible for income tax purpose but there being no expenditure and allowances off. 21 
2. 3 .2 Trading in Insolvent Circumstances its Relevance to Sections 311 and 424 of the 
Companies Act 
One of the most significant barriers to the sanctioning of the scheme relates to the financially 
distressed company's continued insolvency. In considering the prospects of an insolvent 
company following a discharge from liquidation, Coetzee DJP expressed a reluctance to 
sanction compromise and schemes of arrangement that would "send back into business world 
the same hopelessly insolvent company to trade and incur debts as before"22 . Although debt 
subordination has been widely offered as a corrective to the perceived defects of sending back 
into commercial world the same hopelessly insolvent company, Coetzee DJP did not regard 
this as a satisfactory solution and preferred the conversion of the ceded claims into new 
capital. The Court in Multi-bou23 opted for the middle course, holding that a meticulously 
worded subordination could restore a company to solvency. The matter rested for a while, 
unresolved, and when the Appellate Division24 was afforded the chance of taking sides in or 
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contributing to the debate, it affirmed the efficacy of subordination agreements, that the 
'solvency' of the company could be satisfied by subordination. It is important to note, 
furthermore, that the court will only in exceptional circumstances sanction a scheme that 
would permit a company to carry on business where its liability (including future and 
continent debts properly valued) substantially exceed its assets. 
It remains only to address the question of corporate controllers' liability for reckless trading. 
One of the most serious consequences of an insolvent company continuing trading pertains to 
the responsibility of directors25 . In terms of s4 24 personal liability for the debts of a company 
can be imposed on persons who were knowingly a party to the company or any other person 
for fraudulent purpose. It should be remembered that even if it is not possible to establish 
recklessness mens rea it is still sufficient to impose liability. However, the reckless trading 
section has so far proved to be less effective in curbing corporate delinquents. 
In South Africa the position in regard to whether the court ought not to sanction a 
compromise where probable result will be to allow corporate delinquents to go unpunished 
can be described as partially settled. Generally speaking, it is, I think correct to say that the 
Appellate Division has in principle accepted the possibility of wrongdoers escaping liability 
would not bar the court from ordering the summoning of meetings. In doing so the court will 
be placed in a better position to determine the issue when asked to consider the scheme, at 
which stage it will usually determine the effect of the creditors' acceptance of the proposal. 
The same consideration applies with respect to civil liability of corporate officers. 
2.3.3 The Effect of Section 311 Scheme on the Claims of the Revenue 
A scheme that constitutes a fraud on the revenue ought not to be approved. Sections 31 and 
3 2 of the Exchequer Act 66 of 197 5 provide a mechanism by which a state structure, or 
official can write off the whole or any portion of a tax claim, and accordingly if an 
arrangement in terms of s 311 ( 1) contains an offer in respect of such a claim, it can be 
accepted provided that the requirements of s31 of the Act are complied with. Thus in 
Namex26, Van Heerden JA held that the commissioner is bound by s3 l 1 scheme in respect of 
his claims for assessed or known tax liability of company, provided the preconditions set out in 
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the relevant Act are satisfied. 
It will be readily recognized that unknown revenue claims, depending on their magnitude 
could have a significant impact on the success of a s311 scheme, and accordingly a thorough 
investigation (if this is possible) of the company's history is an essential preliminary step. 
Therefore, the taxpayer's first duty is to himself, that is; to ensure full disclosure to the 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue. In that case the assessed or known revenue claims will be 
protected by the ratio decidendi in Namex as the commissioner will be bound as a creditor by 
s3 l 1 scheme 
2.4 Summary 
The s 311 schemes of arrangements and compromise have undergone considerable 
development in South Africa, and there can be little doubt that the law in this area is much 
clearer and a distinct improvement on that of earlier decades. The uncertainties surrounding 
the terms "compromise" or "arrangement" have been logically dispelled into sophisticated 
doctrine with sufficient particularity to afford clear answers to almost all questions relation to 
311 schemes. The Appellate Division in Carbon Development and Namex has put an end to 
the controversy concerning the jurisdictional requirements of s311 by overruling Robin 
judgement. 
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CHAPTER3 
PRIMACY OF ASSESSED LOSS 
In closely prescribed circumstances a loss may give rise to a relief from tax by being set off 
against amount of income and relieving the income from any liability to tax. The foremost and 
paramount reason for acquiring a company in a parlous financial position is the fact that the 
company has a sizeable balance of assessed loss which can be used to generate tax-sheltered 
income. 
The tax planning virtues of s 311 schemes of arrangement and compromise can be frustrated 
by general principles regarding the set-off of assessed loss embodied in s 20. Sections 20( 1) 
read with 20(1(a) result in the forfeiture or sterilization of assessed where the company did not 
carry on trade as envisaged. The application of section 20( 1 )( a)(ii) will result in the elimination 
or reduction of assessed loss to the extent that a concession has been granted by or 
compromise made with creditors. In order to avail himself/herself of the full advantages 
afforded by s 311, the taxpayer must mitigate and circumvent the obstacles placed by s20( 1) 
and 20(1)(a)(ii) in the way of set-off of assessed loss. 
Primacy of Assessed Loss is discussed seems easily explainable in terms of the paper's 
framework of analysis: Assessed loss is the outlet for section 311 schemes or arrangements 
and compromise urges. 
3.2 General Provisions Regarding the Set-Off of Assessed Loss 
Sections 20(1)(a) and 20(1)(a)(ii) of the Act 58 of 1962 provided at the relevant time-
Set-otT of assessed loss 
20. ( 1) For the purpose of determining taxable income derived by any person from carrying 
on any trade with the Republic, there shall be set off against the income so derived by such 
person 
(a) any balance of assessed loss incurred by the taxpayer in any previous year which has 
been carried forward from the preceding year of assessment 
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Revenue Law Jooste (ed) 56, first published as Acta Juridica (1995) Juta & Co. Ltd, at 71 
21.Ibid. 
22. Ex parte Kaplan NNO: In re Robin Consolidated Industries (Pty) Ltd supra at 422E-H 
23. Ex parte Millman supra at 207 
24. Per Goldstone Jin Ex parte De Villiers and Another NNO: In re Carbon Developments (Pty) 
Ltd (In Liquidation) at 505D-E); where the learned judge makes the point that "the fact that the 
liabilities of a company exceed its assests does not necessarily mean that the incurring of further 
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the Companies Act: Two Judicial Approaches" (1989) 3 SA Mere LJ 123 
26. Namex (&Jms) Bpk supra (headnote 271 G-J and 272A-B), See Blackman MS LAWSA supra 
para 67(a) and authorities cited. 
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Provided that -
(i) ............. .. 
(ii) the balance of assessed loss shall be reduced by the amount or value of any benefit 
received by or accruing to a person resulting from a concession or a compromise 
made with his creditors whereby his liabilities to them have been reduced or 
extinguished provided such liabilities arose in the ordinary course of trade. 
It would therefore appear that the scope of the deductions for the purpose of assessed loss 
extends to every admissible deduction (subject to the provisions of any particular provision) 
under the Act despite the seeming limitation in the definition of "assessed loss"1. 
As with companies s20(1) read with s20(l)(a) allows an assessed loss incurred by the taxpayer 
company to be carried forward and set-off against income of a later year which derived from 
carrying on any trade within the Republic, by implication, such a balance of assessed loss 
cannot be set off against such a trade2. Further s20(l)(a) envisages a continuity in setting off 
an assessed loss in every year succeeding the year in which it was originally incurred, so that in 
each year a balance can be struck which can be carried forward from year to year until it is 
exhausted. So, for instance, were the company had accumulated assessed loss in year 1, 
discontinued trading in year 2, there will be no balance of assessed loss to be carried forward 
to be set-off against income in year 3 and subsequent tax years. The privilege of assessed loss 
in year is irretrievably lost. 
3. 3 Discussion of Section 20 
To appreciate the general principles relating to allowability of assessed loss relief, discussion 
of the critical phrases littered in section 20 is order. 
3 .3 .1 Meaning of Income 
The uncertainty over the proper construction of the words "income" used in section 20 
prevailed in Conshu3• Whatever its demerits4, the primary meaning given to the word 
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"income" in the introductory part of s 20(1) by the majority appears to be compatible with the 
arithmetic of determining taxable income. Harms JA referred, further to, assessed loss brought 
forward from the preceding tax year and " concluded that a 'a set off in terms of s20 can only 
arise if there would otherwise have been taxable income"5. 
In sharp contrast, the minority thought that the word 'income' in s20(1) bore its defined 
meaning. There was nothing in the Act to indicate that the set-off of an assessed loss could 
operate only after the other deductions had been made and only if there remained an amount 
of taxable income as suggested by Harms JA. G J Swart6 contends that the view preferred by 
the majority as to the requirements for the set-off of an assessed loss by a company under 
s20( 1) of the Act conflicts with the history of s20( 1) and principles upon which s20( 1) is 
based. Accordingly s20( 1) does not require the earning of taxable income or income from 
trade as the prerequisite for set-off of an assessed loss by a company or of a trade during the 
tax year. 
Although the oppressive results as elucidated by the minority would ensue as result of the 
meaning given to income in section 20 by the majority, this does not detract from correctness 
of Harms JA's construction. If it is possible to place reasonable construction to taxable 
income in section 20(1), which does not lead to anomalous results as suggested by EM 
Grosskopf, - then, the majority view is preferred. The only safe conclusion that can be drawn 
is that "it would be most undesirable for the Revenue not to take not of both the majority' 
view as to the meaning of 'income' in section 20 and its consequences as spelled out by the 
minority"7. 
3.3.2 Derivation of income not required 
The principle that derivation of income is not a prerequisite under s20(1) applies to the set-off 
of assessed -but with difficulty. That s20(1) may be applied even where no income was earned 
during the relevant tax year, as long as the company carried on trade has not been accepted 
without demur by some commentators. The views of textbook writers on the issue are not 
uniform. Thus, E Spiro8 justifies the conclusion that there has to be some income from trade 
against which the set off can operate was inevitable if one followed the letter of the provisions. 
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In support of this proposition, reference is made to s 20(2A)(b) which specifically provides 
that a taxpayer other than company shall not be prevented from carrying forward a balance of 
assessed loss merely by reason of the fact that no income has been derived during a tax year, 
indicates that a derivation of income is a requirement for the set-off of assessed loss by a 
company. This seems to be the view favoured by AP De Koker, TS Emslie and CR Frame9. In 
my view this proposition does not take into account the scheme behind the general deduction 
formula and sections 11-23(g) and the relevant authorities. 
In rebuttal G J Swart, points out that "the introductory words of s 11 mirror in most respect 
those of s20(1), for example the deductions provided for in sl l(a) -(x) as well as the assessed 
loss provided for in s20 should be deducted from a set-off against the income" derived by [the 
taxpayer] from carrying on "any trade within the Republic"10. It is so widely formulated, G J 
Swart says, that "a company must earn income before it can set-off an assessed loss from the 
past immediately raises the question why the derivation of income is not seen as a requirement 
under sl 1 "11 . 
I must respectfully associate myself with this explanation relying, as it does on the scheme 
behind the general deduction formula and line of authorities. That expenditure and losses can, 
in terms of the general deduction formula, be deducted from trade to the extent to which they 
were incurred, laid or expended in the production of income (ssl l(a) and 32(g)) finds support 
in the judgement of the Appellate Division in SIR v Guardian Assurance Holdings (SA) Ltd12 
and CIR v Nemojim (Pty) Ltd 13. Also, expenditure will not be disqualified as a deduction if it 
produces no income in the tax year in which it is incurred or if it eventually fails to produce 
any income as long as it was incurred for purposes of earning income in that year or a future 
year. The argument that deductible expenditure must have demonstrable result on the 
taxpayer's income was also rejected in KBI v Van der Walt14. 
It follows that the absence of a profit will not necessarily disqualify an expense as an allowable 
deduction. The remarks of Corbett JA (as he then was) in De Beers Holdings (Pty) Ltd, are 
apposite 
" ....... the absence of a pro.fit does not necessarily exclude a transaction.from being part of 
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the taxpayer's trade, and correspondingly money's laid out in a non-profitable transaction 
may nevertheless be ... expended for the purpose of trade within the terms of s23(g) such 
moneys may well de disbursed on the grounds of commercial expediency or in order to 
indirectly facilitate the carrying on of the taxpayer's trade15" 
This leads the learned author to conclude with reference to s20(1 ), that it recognizes that the 
allowable expenses may exceed the taxpayer's income by allowing taxpayers to carry forward 
such excess to a following tax year as an assessed loss. The object of s20( 1) is clearly to 
provide for the recovery in future tax years, of expenditure and losses not recovered in full 
from income from trade during a tax year. This function was implicitly recognized in Lockie 
Bros Ltd16. 
3.3.3 Meaning of "Balance of Assessed Loss" 
An "Assessed loss" is defined, for the purpose of s20, as "any amount by which the 
deductions" admissible under sections 11-19, inclusive, exceed the income in respect of which 
they are so admissible ." 
The passage in Income Tax Cases & Material17 provides an apt explanation of the expression 
'balance of assessed loss'. The expression 'balance of assessed loss' in s20(l)(a) refers to the 
situation where the income or taxable income of a particular year is more than swallowed up 
by deductions, a current year's assessed loss of a previous year, resulting in a balance of 
assessed loss which can be carried forward to the against the income of that year. If in a year 
(year 2) subsequent to that in which such balance was ascertained (year 1) the taxpayer 
derives no income from carrying on a trade against which balance can be set-off arrive at a 
fresh balance of assessed loss to be carried forward, then, in the following year (year 3); the 
taxpayer is precluded from setting off the initial balance ( i.e. from year 1) against its income 
by the requirement that the balance to be set off must have been carried forward from the 
preceding year of assessment (year 2). 
ITC 664 sums up the balance of assessed loss in the following terms: 
"Assessment are made on yearly basis and ifthere be no income in any particular year, all that 
is revealed in such a case is a minus quantity, not a balance. Hence one is thrown back to the 
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· original loss or balance of assessed loss, the set off of which is negated by the requirements 
that it must have carried forward from the preceding year of assessment"18. 
As appears from the analysis of ITC19 664, it is this excess ('balance of assessed loss') that 
may be carried forward to the succeeding year of assessment. Alternatively, if an assessed loss 
arises from the trading operations of the current year, and it is the aggregate loss that 
represents the balance of assessed loss to be carried froward to the next year of assessment for 
the set-off against the income. 
The carry forward is from 'preceding year'. It follows that if in a particular year no balance of 
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assessed loss is determined in preparation for future use, there cannot, be in the subsequent 
year, a looking to past20 A ready made example of this would SA Bazaars (Pty) Ltd 21, where 
the courts held that it was not competent for a company which had discontinued trading within 
the meaning of section 11 ( 1) in a particular year, to set-off in its income tax return for that 
year the balance of assessed loss incurred by it in previous year. Mercantile abstinence can 
result in forfeiture of the relevant assessed loss. 
3.3.4 Meaning of "Ordinary Course of Trade" 
The privilege of assessed loss relief does not apply where a company did not carry on trade 
during the tax year. The taxpayer is saddled with the onus of showing that the activity in 
question is attributable to trading activity within the context of s20(1). It is a question of fact 
whether the taxpayer's activities amount to carry on trading. Section 20(l)(a)(ii) refers to 
"liabilities arising in the ordinary course of trade". This would appear to have wider 
application than the recoupment provisions which specifically refer to recoupments of 
expenditure deductions allowed in terms of sections 11 to 20 of the Act. 
This was nicely illustrated in an earlier Rhodesian case, Av Commissioner of Taxes22, the 
court held that where a subsidiary had borrowed money from its holding company at a nominal 
rate of interest, this was a liability arising in the "ordinary course of trade". The judgement 
refers to the case of Down Distributing Co. (Pty) Ltd v Associated Blue Star Store (Pty) Ltd, 
CLR 463, where the court was concerned with the interpretation of a similar expression. Rich 
J said of the expression: 
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"It means that the transaction must fall into place as part of the undistinguished common 
flow of business done, that it should form part of the ordinary course of business as carried 
on, calling for no remark and arising out of no special particular situation"23 
Goldin J then suggests; 
"The motives which induce a creditor to lend money at all or an unusually easy or desirable 
terms not relevant consideration ... The fact that the lending of money was not part of the 
creditors trade or that the loans were not made in the ordinary course of the creditors trade 
is not relevant"24. 
Although the court was not called upon to decide the point, there is suggestion that liabilities 
incurred on capital account would not be included as a liability arising in the "ordinary course 
of trade". Meyerowitz and Spiro25 suggest that s20(1)(a)(ii) is open and that liabilities arising 
from capital expenditure, ie; expenditure not taken into account in determining the taxable 
income. 
Recently, the Special Court26 has sought guidance on the badges of trade from an instructive 
judgement of Sir Nicolas Browne-Wikinson, then Vice-Chancellor, in Mason v Morton ( 1986) 
1 WLR 1343 (ChD)27. Wunsh J dealt with the question whether profit realised on sale of 
diamonds was receipt of capital or revenue nature. 
Farming investment portfolio 
It is firmly established that the carrying on trade involves an active step something far more 
than merely watching existing investments which are not intended or expected to be, income 
producing during the year in question. Let us look more closely at ITC28 1476, which 
established that "if a company once carried on a trade it does not follow that, as long as it 
retains its investments, it therefore continues to trade. It may retain its shares and investment 
previously required but cease on a trade again. The Special Court declined to accept that 
activities of the company in which the taxpayer held investments constituted carrying on a 
trade on behalf of the taxpayer company. In reaching a decision adverse to the company, Kirk-
Cohen J, considered in the light of probabilities, that the appellant has not established that it 
endeavoured to perform any act during that year which would have constituted carrying on a 
trade in terms of the judgement of Neser J. 
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It is essential that the company keep a constant watch over its investment portfolio and 
'farming' it assiduously. 
Interruption of trading activity 
Temporary closure of a company's business may result in the forfeiture of assessed loss, as it 
will be regarded as not carrying on a trade as long as it keeps its business closed, even if it 
intends resuming its trading activity at a later date. Aubrey S Silke29 contends that in order to 
alleviate this oppressive result, the carry forward of a loss should be permitted where a 
company has through no fault of its own not been able to carry on business activity during the 
year. 
The section 20(l)(a) consequences of interruption of trade has been reliably fixed in both SA 
Bazaars (Pty) Ltd30 and New Urban Properties Ltd31 . In the former case it was held that 
s20(1)(a) properly interpreted, means that where a taxpayer has not traded at any time during 
the current tax year, there is nothing against which the assessed loss brought forward from 
previous year can be set off in that year. In the latter case this logic was taken step further, and 
the court held that such a situation there is no "balance of assessed loss" to be carried forward 
into the following year. It is a question of fact whether a particular activity constitutes trading 
within the meaning of s20( 1 )(a). A number of cases have previously been taken on to the 
courts to determine the existence or absence of carrying on a trade in terms of s20( 1) during 
the relevant year of assessment. The decisions of their lordship Page J and Schutz JA in both 
Timberfellers Ltd32 and Robin Consolidated Industries Ltd33 respectively have added the 
lengthening list. 
Collecting pre-liquidation debts 
The reasoning of the Timberfellers' court is that collection of outstanding pre-liquidation 
debts, in the circumstances did not constitute carrying on a trade. The relevant facts were as 
follows. The taxpayer encountered financial difficulties leading to final liquidation until an 
offer of compromise sanctioned in terms of s 311 of the Companies Act. Followings 311 
compromise and restoration to solvency, the company collected outstanding debts in order to 
enable McCarthy to recover, in so far as he could, the amounts to which he was entitled 
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through the loan account of Sharon Air (Pty) Ltd, not one cent in the money collected was 
utilised or made for trading activity on the part of appellant and it was clearly not intended too 
further such any activity. 
Page J said it was clear that; 
"The question of whether the collection of debts constitutes trading has been considered in a 
number of cases whilst the recovery of monies owing as result of a transaction in the course 
of trade is, of necessity, an integral part of that transaction, the effect of the case law is that 
this, in itself, does not necessarily mean that such recovery amounts to carrying on trade"34. 
The case of Merchant v Commissioner of Taxes35 was cited as support for the proposition 
that the collection of debts; per; was insufficient to constitute carrying on trade" In casu the 
collection of debts was analogous to making available as capital of the monies earned prior to 
the placing of the company in liquidation before.disposing of it to the party. 
But there is a glimmer of hope in the Timberfellers case. The court acknowledged that a party 
may carry on trade within the meaning of s20( 1) -through the agency of another and there is 
nothing in the section to warrant a limitation of its ambit to trade carried on by the taxpayer 
personally or to exclude the operation of the ordinary rule that quid per alium per se; if the 
collection of debts which took place through the agency of others does amount to carrying on 
a trade, then; their actions should be regarded as those of the taxpayer for the purpose of the 
section. 36 
The foregoing authority mandates the conclusion that whether debt collection amount to 
carrying on a trade is a question of fact. 
Inactively carrying on trade 
The main issue before the Appellate Division in Robin Consolidated Industries Ltd, was 
whether the sales in question were effected in the course of their trading activities and whether 
the company did carry on a trade in the 1988 year of assessment. 
With regard to trading in a state oflimbo, his lordship said it was clear that: 
"the creditors had decided to bring an end to trading as soon as this could be advantageously 
done and they had accepted an offer to purchase from which was excluded the stock bond 
and thereafter no trading venture was to commence - certainly no trading venture in any 
ordinary sense". 37 
Cases referred on this aspect included J &R O'Kane & Co38 and ITC 172 (1930) 5 SATC 
171 39, which supported the proposition that the disposal of the stock was designed to allow 
others to trade and the circumstance in which the stock in bond was sold in the instant case 
were not of the same genre. The learned judge said he was entitled to conclude that: 
"while the replenishment of stock is an indicium of trading, there was none of that present in 
casu, but rather, positive steps were taken to see that the appellant did not receive stocks 
already destined for it, the stock in transit and in bond'40 . 
Accordingly the disposal of the stock in bond was designed to allow other to trade in stock 
and release appellant from the risks entailed in doing so itself. 
Counsel for the appellant, in the second submission sought from their lordship - the unusual 
course of having the Appellate Division depart from the line authoritatively laid down by his 
lordship Centlivres JA in SA Bazaars (Pty) Ltd. It was established that a set off of assessed 
loss would be measured against (a) income derived from trade and (b) where the balance of 
assessed loss has been carried forward from the preceding year. This was later reinforced in 
New Urban Properties Ltd, where it was said that a balance can be carried forward from any 
year only if a balance has been struck in that year, which clearly means: if in year reflecting the 
balance of assessed loss at the end of it. 
The principal contention advanced by counsel was "that for any balance to have been 
assessed for that year as only assessed losses can be carried forward from that year 
immediately preceding it must have been assessed for that year as only assessed losses can be 
struck in that year". Reliance was unsuccessfully placed on the construction of s 20(1 ). In this 
regard Schutz JA said the following: 
" ..... the attribution of excessive tautology to the legislature and a failure to read the words 
as they are, thus part of the appellant argument falls short of demonstrating that the 
11 
construction adopted in the two case, SA Bazaars case and New Urban Properties Ltd case, is 
wrong, even loss, clearly, inf act it is correct and this disposes of argument that the second 
proposition in the SA Bazaars is wrong as not being based on the subsection". 41 
Therefore there was no compelling reason for departing from antecedent dicta, and 
"That once the meaning of the words of section in an Act of Parliament have been 
authoritatively determined by it, that meaning must be given to them, even by this court, 
unless it is clear to it that it has erred'. 42 
In summing up the Court's robust stance, his lordship highlighted the potential dangers of 
detouring from the stare decisis when a decision has been acted on for decades in such a 
manner that rights have grown under it," 
"That forty-five years businessmen and the Revenue have been ordering their affairs on the 
assumption that the SA Bazaars case laid down the law and there has been no material 
change in the context in which the rule in that case operates, so that this would have been a 
especially slow to depart from its earlier decisions". 43 
It was further emphasised that " in order to succeed, appellant has to overcome both 
propositions in the SA Bazaars case, and on the second appellant must fail, in regard to the 
first proposition (set off only against income derived from trade), appellant conceded, and 
correctly so, that the proposition was properly derived from the section". 44 
In short, the survival of balance of assessed loss carry forwards stands and falls on the 
taxpayer establishing continuity of trading activities. Mercantile abstinence during a tax year 
may prove to be fatal to set-off of an assessed loss -and could result in forfeiture of assessed 
loss. 
3. 3. 5 Carry on Discriminating 
One general remark before quitting this branch of the subject. The trade requirement for the 
set-off of assessed loss has been fruitful of controversy because of its discriminatory effect. 
There has never been compelling justification in principle for such potential discrimination45 . It 
remains to consider the only difference between the position of companies and that of persons 
other than companies -a company is precluded from utilizing an assessed loss from a previous 
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year in which there was mercantile abstinence. I allude to these facts·only to show that, so far 
from violating the precept of horizontal equity -its also susceptible to constitutional challenge. 
3.3.6 Meaning of "with his creditors" 
The ceiling which governs the application of s20(1)(a)(ii) is that a concession granted by or 
compromise made "with his creditors". 
The issue before the Special Court in [336] NO 855846 was whether a compromise made with, 
or a concession granted by, a single creditor does not fall within the scope of s20(1)(a)(ii). 
Support for this proposition is found in the Rhodesian dicta in Blue Moon Investment (Pvt) 
Ltd47. Section 20(1)(a)(ii) did not specifically require the concession to be granted by, or the 
compromise to be made with, the general body of the taxpayers's creditors: The plural used in 
the subsection includes the singular, and a concession by or a compromise with a single 
creditor can reduce the amount of a balance of assessed loss. 
3 .4 Application of Section 20(1 )(a)(ii) 
Before looking at the application of section 20( 1 )( a )(ii), it will be convenient to mention that 
there is no concession or compromise merely because creditors write off the taxpayer's 
liability as a bad debt. 48 It becomes clear, therefore, that a debt written remains legally 
enforceable. In nutshell to constitute a concession or compromise by the creditors is binding 
on them. 
Literal reading of section 20(1)(a)(ii) would seem to provide that the balance of assessed loss 
that is to be reduced by the value or amount of the compromise benefit, is the balance of 
assessed loss as existing at the beginning of the year of assessment in which the compromise is 
reached with the creditors. In, Louis Zinn Organization (Pty) Ltd, it was held that the balance 
of assessed loss that is to be reduced by the compromise benefit is the balance of assessed loss 
as existing at the end of the year of assessment during which the compromise benefit accrued. 
With Louis Zinn Organisation (Pty) Ltd case should be contrasted with the finding of the 
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Special Court which concluded that: 
"this subsection, it will be seen, makes specific provision for the deduction of the amount of a 
benefit of this nature from an assessed loss in a prior year which has been brought forward. 
There is no provision for the deduction of such an amount from a loss in the current year. 
The very clear wording of the section limits the deduction to one from an assessed loss 
brought forward from a prior year". 49 
Speaking for himself and the members of the Appellate Division, Schreiner ACJ, explained 
that in dealing with the term "balance of assessed loss", it should be kept in mind that: 
"although at the stage where it is to be used, i.e. when it is be set off against a profit, a 
balance of assessed loss looks back to the past, at the stage where it is being determined i.e. 
when its amount is being calculated, it looks forward to the future when it will be rejected'. 50 
With reference to the section which provides that "the balance of assessed loss shall be 
reduced", Schreiner ACJ said that the paragraph was referring to the stage of application or to 
stage of determination. He considered that the word "reduce" is more appropriate to the 
determination stage, since:-
"once the balance of assessed loss is determined you cannot really reduce it- you can only 
reduce its effect by countering it with another amount". 51 
In my view, the taxpayer should be given the benefit of the ambiguity of the section. 
An example of this application as interpreted by the courts is as follows52 : 
JCI Ltd has an assessed loss ofR 320 000 at 31 December 1997, its year end. In February 
1998 it entered into a compromise with its creditors whereby its liabilities to them were 
reduced by R 260 000. 
1. Assume for the year ended 31 December 1997 the company made a taxable profit of R3 20 
000, before the set-off of the assessed loss brought forward. 
Taxable profit 
Less assessed loss 
R 350 000 
R320 000 
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Taxable income R30 000 
As there is no "balance of assessed loss" existing at the end, there is no set-off of the 
compromise benefit. 
2. Assume that for the year ended 31 December 1997 the company made a taxable profit of 
R250 000 before the set-off of the assessed loss brought forward. 
Taxable profit R250 000 
Less assessed loss 
Balance of assessed loss 
compromise benefit 
(limited to balance of assessed loss 
Assessable loss carried forwards to 1998 
R320 000 , 
R 70 000 
NIL 
Although the company itself will no taxable income for the year, the balance of assessed loss 
will not be carried forward to 1998 as it is extinguished through the set-off of the compromise 
benefit. 
3.4.1 Computation of the amount or value of the benefit 
It is common ground that the trigger for the application of section 20(1)(a)(ii) is the amount or 
value of benefit as result of concession granted by or compromise made with creditors. Once it 
is determined that a company has derived a benefit from the concession granted by or 
compromise made with creditors, the Commissioner is saddled with an onus of quantifying the 
aforesaid benefit. One of the problems sometimes encountered in applying section 
20(1)(a)(ii) is whether or not the benefit value or amount is quantifiable. It has long been 
settled that a benefit has an amount or value if it is moneys worth or can be turned into money. 
It has been emphasised in cases such as Butcher Bros (Pty) Ltd53 and H.W. Lategan54_that to 
be an "amount'"' something must have an ascertainable money value. In this context the 
reasoning ofHefer JA is worth quoting in full: 
"It must be emphasised that income in a form other than money must, in order to qualify for 
inclusion in the "gross income" be of such a nature that a value can be attached to it in 
money. As Wessels CJ said in the Delfos case (supra) at 251, 
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'The tax is to be assessed in money on all receipts or accruals having a money value. If it is 
something which is not in money's worth or cannot be turned into money, it is not to be 
regarded as income"55 
As Wunsh J observed in ITC 1613, 
"There are, other provisions of the Act, prescribed methods for determining amounts or 
values- see,for example, paras 5(e) and(/) of the definition of 'gross income' in section 1. 
Section 8A (3) is another part of the Act which establishes the ways in which an 'amount' 
must be ascertained (the guidelines of a gain made or even guidelines are given for the 
application of section 20(J)(a)(ii))"56. 
In view of section 82, the Commissioner is saddled with formidable and difficult onus proving 
or ascertaining the value of the benefit accruing to the taxpayer. If the Commissioner fails to 
establish the amount or value of a compromise benefit or any of the quantified figures, the 
assessed loss in question will not be reduced or obliterated by invocation of section 
20(1)(a)(ii). All in all the assessed loss will survive the Commissioner's counter attack under 
the relevant provisions of section 20(1 )(a)(ii). 
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RETENTION OF ASSESSED LOSS 
As indicated the primary explanation for the proposer availing himself/herself of the machinery 
provided by section 311 is not necessarily to rescue insolvent from provisional liquidation, but the 
company's accumulated assessed loss. Effecting section 311 scheme does not necessarily translate 
into a tax advantage as result of operation of section 20(1)(a)(ii). It is provided by section 
20(1)(a)(ii) that the compromise must have been between the company and its creditors, and only 
then will the balance of assessed loss to be carried forward to the next year of assessment be 
reduced by the value of the compromise benefit. 
It 1'ecomes clear that if a person acquiring a company wishes to preserve an assessed loss which 
the company might enjoy for tax purpose, the amount or value of any concession must be kept 
to an absolute minimum. The company's assessed loss will be eroded to the extent of the amount 
of any concession by or compromise with creditors. 1 
This chapter will therefore explore possible strategies by which an insolvent company's assessed 
loss can be preserved. Tax planning, however, always makes a good deal even better. 
4.2 Avoiding the Provisions of Section 20(1)(a)(ii) 
4.2.1 Acquisition of Creditors' Claims by the Offerer 
In general to overcome the negative effects of s20(1)(a)(ii), the one suggested route is to buy 
out the creditors' claims against the company for a reduced sum, usually equal to the amount the 
creditors would have accepted as compromise with the company. This offer to purchase the 
creditors' claims is conditional upon the offerer acquiring the share capital in the company and 
the release of the company form provisional liquidation. Indeed, if prudent, having acquired the 
creditors' claims, the offerer then enters into a compromise with the company, whereby his newly 
acquired claims against the company are reduced by a nominal amount, usually RI per claim or 
one cent in the rent. In this way the compromise benefit, except for the nominal reduction has 
effectively been transacted 'outside' the company and the assessed loss of the company remains 
substantially intact. 
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Moreover, the offerer has acquired large claims against the company (usually transferred to a loan 
account), which claims can be repaid to the offerer, potentially free of tax, once the company 
returns to a profitable position2. 
4.2.3 Realization of Claims by the Offeror 
Whether or not the excess between the amount received on a subsequent realisation of the claims 
and the amount paid for these is taxable will depend on whether such an amount forms part of 
gross income of the offerer or not. 
In section I gross income is defined as meaning: 
"in the case of any person, total amount in cash or otherwise, received by or accrued to or in 
favour of such person during such year or a period of assessment, from a source within or 
deemed to be within the Republic excluding receipts or accruals of capital nature ................ " 
For the purpose of determining whether the proceeds on realisation of the claims fall into gross 
income as defined will depend primarily on whether or not the offerer is carrying on a trade or 
scheme of profit making and whether the amount received constituted capital or revenue. The 
term trade is defined to include: 
"every profession, trade, business, employment, calling, occupation or venture .............. " 
There have been many cases where the courts have made distinction between individuals and 
companies in determining whether the taxpayer was carrying on a business or not. Wessels C J 
in CIR v Stott stated the law as follows: 
"As a general rule, one or two isolated transactions cannot be described as the carrying on of 
a business. A single undertaking may be of such a nature that can be correctly described as a 
business. If you are dealing with a company one of whose objects is to buy and sell land, then 
the company might well be considered to be doing business of buying and selling land even 
though it carries out only a single transaction, but when an individual like a surveyor who is not 
professional carrying on the occupation of a land jobber buys and sells one or more plots of 
land cannot be said prima facie to be doing the business of a land jobber. Before it can be said 
that an individual is carrying on a business there must be some proof of continuity. 3" 
It is quite well settled principle that it is not an essential requirement that a taxpayer be carrying 
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on a trade or business in a particular type of asset in order for the proceeds derived from the 
realization of such an asset to be regarded as income subject to tax. But equally established is that 
the real test depends upon the intention or motive behind the transaction and whether there is a 
scheme of profit-making involved4. The onus of proving that any receipt is of a capital nature 
is on the taxpayer. He must establish the facts from which the desired inference can and should 
be properly drawn. In a case5 where a taxpayer acquired for a nominal value shares and loan 
account in a company with an assessed loss with the specific intention of diverting income to that 
company and utilising the income to repay his loan account in full, it was held that the taxpayer 
was carrying out a profit-making scheme and he was accordingly taxed on the proceeds of the 
loan account. 
If the object of the share acquisition is to make an investment and the debt is acquired as "part 
and parcel" of the whole transaction is one of capital nature, so that if the debt is acquired at a 
price which is below the face value, any profit made on the collection of the debt is one of a 
capital nature. On the other hand, if there is a dual intention in acquiring the shares and debt, i.e. 
to acquire the shares as an investment and to acquire the debts as part of a profit making scheme, 
the profit on realisation of the debts will form part of gross income. It is submitted that the 
majority of "section 311 schemes" which follow route mentioned earlier, would fall into this 
category. A diversion of income to the company and an early repayment of the claims would 
enhance this view. 
If the acquisition and subsequent realisation of the claims form part of a scheme of profit-making, 
the claims when acquired, will be regarded as trading stock in the hands of the offeror. The 
definition of"trading stock" in section of the Act 58 of 1962 read at the relevant time:-
"Trading Stock" "includes anything ... purchased or in any other manner acquired by a taxpayer 
for the purposes of ... sale or the procedure from the disposal of which forms or will form part 
of gross income" 
The Act further provides :-
" That the amount . . Which shall be taken into account in respect of the value of any trading 
account in respect of the value of any stock held and not disposed of by him ........ shall be the 
cost price to such person of such trading stock. ............ " 
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As was stated in De Beers (Pty) Ltd6, the definition of 'trading stock' in section 1 of the Act may 
be notionally and grammatically divided into two parts - the first parts lays emphasis upon the 
purpose for which anything may have been produced, manufactured, purchased or in any other 
manner acquired by a taxpayer - the specified purpose are manufacture, sale or exchange by the 
taxpayer or on his behalf; the second part makes no direct reference to any purpose which the 
taxpayer have had at the time of acquisition - it postulates an objective assessment, namely 
whether if the thing under consideration was disposed off, the proceeds would form part of his 
gross mcome. 
To illustrate: in each year ofrealisation a problem might arise in determining the cost of the claims 
purchased from the decisions from the creditors were not all on the same terms. For example, 
secured claims may have been purchased for full value and concurrent claims purchased for say 
100 - in the rand. As the claims would have all effectively been merged into one claim (usually 
loan account) it will be extremely difficult to identify which claim has been realised in each year. 
and therefore the cost to be excluded from the offeror' s closing stock for that year of assessment 
Presumably in such instances the cost of acquiring the total claims would be apportioned . 
proportionately to the amounts realised. 
In order to avoid this type of situation it is suggested that the different classes of claims acquired 
be separately identifiable in the company's balance sheet and in the offeror' s trading account. 
4.3 Ways of Preserving Assessed Loss 
4.3.1 The Standard Scheme 
On answer to avoiding the provisions of section 20(1 )(a)(ii) has already d been discussed. The 
thrust of the standard scheme has been succinctly described by Selikowitz in Namex. 
"The 'standard scheme' is essentially one which the offeror makes sum of moeny available to a 
"receiver" who is required to distribute it, as a dividend, to the creditors of the company in 
liquidation. In return for the dividend, the creditors lose all further rights against the company. 
Their claims, however, persist, and are ceded or deemed to have been ceded to the offeror who 
thereby acquirers a loan account effectively equal to the company's total existing liability. It is 
also usual that the claims of the creditors are reduced by a nominal amount (!or example one 
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cent in the rand). The last provision was developed in an effort to establish that the scheme was, 
in fact, one between the company and its creditors - as is required bys 311 of the Companies 
Act -and not merely between the offeror and the creditors. It is also common for the scheme to 
be made conditional upon the offeror gaining control of the company and the liquidation order 
being set aside. The effect of the 'standard scheme' is to vest control of the company in the 
offeror who acquires a "clean company", i.e. one without outside creditors. The offeror can seek 
to take advantage of any assessed losses in the company and can use his loan account to draw 
income from the company with tangible tax benefits". 7 
After what threatened to a major setback to its rapid development8, but proved to be mere 
'hiccup', the standard scheme has been restored to full effect. It will therefore be recognised that, 
although the Appellate Division has not explicitly approved the 'standard scheme', there are 
persuasive obiter indicating that, if it were compelled to address the issue, it would possibly come 
down in its favour. If this were to happen, the legal position would revert to that which obtained 
before the Cape and Transavaal court upset the apple cart9 
4.3.2 Partial Cession Scheme 
In the footsteps of the standard scheme followed partial cession scheme as a corrective to the 
perceived defects of the latter scheme. In the Multibou 10 case the Court declined to put stamp 
of approval on the Partial Cession scheme. The essential feature of the proposed scheme was that 
the acquirer would receive, by way of cession, 99 percent creditors' claims against payment of 
a stipulated amount. The company would then borrow on loan account from the acquirer a further 
amount to be paid to creditors for the remaining one per cent of their claims. Both amounts would 
be paid to receiver who would be responsible for making a distribution to creditors on sanction 
of the scheme. 
If sanctioned would preserve the assessed loss, thus rendering s20(1)(a)(ii) inoperative. The court 
further rejected the arrangement on the ground that it was a sham, a disguised or simulated 
transaction. It was structured to give the appearance and impression of an arrangement between 
the company and its creditors. When in substance it was an arrangement between the off eror and 
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the creditors. 
4.3.3 The Preference Share Scheme 
Another more popular method of preserving assessed loss is through the preference share scheme 
route. The essence of this type of scheme is that the claims of the creditors, as reduced by a 
capital amount paid to them in terms of the scheme. They are converted into preference share 
capital and the creditors are then deemed to have renounced their entitlement to the issue and of 
a person (usually the offerer) nominated by the company. The rights of the creditors under such 
arrangement are confined to the right to claim payment of the dividend receivable by them under 
the agreement. As explained in Bolstone11 the preference share scheme route is on all fours with 
the jurisdictional requirements of section 311 (ie. that the arrangement is indeed one between the 
company and its creditors). It was correctly pointed out that the company was directly involved, 
and reference was made to the fact the scheme required the company, inter alia; to pass a 
resolution to capitalise the creditors' claims, to issue shares and to pay the capital sum to the 
creditors. 
The hardest question is whether the preference share method preserves the company's assessed 
loss. This returns us, full circle to section 20(1)(a)(ii). The interaction between preference share 
scheme and s20(l)(a)(I) has become a contentious issue in South African law12. 
To this point , the core premise advanced by the proponents of the preference share scheme is 
that the liability to repay a debt of a certain amount has been replaced with a liability to redeem 
preference shares at a value equal to the amount of the debt, place it beyond the reach of section 
20(l)(a)(ii). It bears mentioning that the form of the liability has changed, the amount thereof is 
the same as before and accordingly the company has not received a benefit from the scheme 
sufficient to reduce the assessed loss13. 
In rebuttal, The Taxpayer14 suggests that the preference share scheme would fall foul of 
s20(l)(a)(ii). It submits that a benefit does accrue to the company but what is difficult to 
adjudicate is whether the benefit result from a concession granted by or compromise made with 
its creditors. The Taxpayer submits that a persuasive approach is to examine the quid pro quo to 
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which the creditors become entitled of their claims, if it is adequate then there is no concession 
must have been granted or compromise made. Reference is further made to an Australian decision 
(Grant v federal Commissioner ofTaxation15) as highly instructive in this regard. In this case the 
taxpayer paid $97 000 for allotment of97 000 preference shares at $87 770. Notwithstanding the 
fact that in terms of company law it was not possible to pay less than $97 000 for the allotment 
of 97 000 & 1 par value preference shares. The taxpayer was held liable for gift duty on the 
difference between the amount paid and the market value of the shares allotted. However, in a 
minority judgement Jacobs J held that as lawful minimum had been paid for the preference shares 
the allotment received was lawful minimum consideration for the money paid and there no liability 
for gift duty16. 
Further, The Taxpayer17 considers the question whether a compromise or concession has been 
granted or made where creditors receive for value of preference shares for the face value of their 
claims to be directly analogous. On the other hand, if the shares to which the former creditors 
become entitled notwithstanding that in the present context entitlement is renounced in favour of 
a third party, have a market value of less than the amount of the claims, then a concession by the 
creditors would seem to have been granted. Perhaps a municipal court may adopt the approach 
of Jacobs that since the lawful minimum has been paid for the par value preference shares no 
concession or compromise can objectively be said to be present. 
The Taxpayer refrains from speculating on which approach is likely to be followed in South Africa 
although the journal states that it inclines towards the majority view in the Grant case that the 
market value of the shares ought to prevail over the par value. They state that there is local 
authority for such approach, albeit in different circumstances in Lace Proprietary Mines Ltd 18, 
where the court held that the taxpayer received 1000 000 shares as consideration and the shares 
had to be valued according to their market value. The Taxpayer, however, indicates that it is 
willing not to be dogmatic on the question of the existence of a concession granted by creditors 
under the preference share scheme although their inclination is toward the view that if the amount 
of the claims is reduced a concession has been granted. The fact that the creditor proceed to 
renounce their entitlement to lesser amount seems, to the The Taxpayer, to corroborate the view 
that a compromise or concession has taken place. 
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The keystone of the contention that preference share scheme possibly renders the provisions of 
s20(1 )(a)(ii) wholly or partially inoperative rests on the following grounds 19 : 
(a) No benefit has in fact been received by or accrued to the company in that although the form 
of liability has changed(ie, the creditor's claim into redeemable preference shares) the amount 
thereof (ie. the liability to redeem at the issue price which price is equal to the unpaid value of the 
creditors' claims) and the obligation to repay some has remained as before. 
(b) It is general rule that a company cannot issue share on terms that it shall or may redeem then 
at an agreed future date as such redemption would amount to a purchase of its own shares, which 
is illegal. There is one exception to this general rule, however, the Companies Act makes 
provision for the issue of shares or out of profits for dividend. From a financial point of view 
redeemable preference shares may be regarded in the circumstance as hybrid form of shares and 
debentures incorporating features of both, though in law they are clearly treated as shares. 
It has been emphasised in ITC20 1613 that any agreement or dispensation attributable to amending 
the capitai structure relieving of the company by converting creditors' claims into permanent or 
long-term capital, must redound to its benefit. It is basically one which is undertaken to enable the 
company continue its normal operations. According to Wunsh J, the latter feature compels the 
conclusion that the company derived benefit from the arrangement and conversion of creditors 
claims to share capital. This grossly overstates the value of the future benefit against which the 
present set-off of assessed loss might be. reduced. The new capital structure (redeemable 
preference shares) cannot be viewed as an asset of lasting value, rather, the restructuring confers 
on the company only ephemeral benefit of being to clear an existing hurdle and continue business. 
The problem is compounded by the inadequate emphasis given to the distribution of assets in ITC 
1613 which is the detriment inherent in a preference share scheme is weighed against whatever 
positive aspects the compromise might have, it is difficult to view substantial and largely 
uncompensated expenditure necessary to meet current exigencies21 . 
In this regard it might well be said that the preference scheme resorted to by the taxpayer in ITC 
1613 involved an agreement by the creditors to accept shares pro tanto in payment of their 
claims22. Although the shares were issued at an allotment price equal to the corresponding face 
value of their claims, it does not follow that they were worth their issue price. It is true that if the 
preference shareholders had undertaken action to enforce price payment of their claims, they 
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would not be paid in full. 
Despite the presence of concession granted by creditors, in the present case, the assessed loss 
survived section 20(1)(a)(ii) . The Commissioner's could not establish that the amount or value 
of the company's benefit was R18 807 524 or any of the quantified figures23. 
These flaws do not invalidate the preference share scheme, but do suggest that it is only a partial 
solution. These critical comments about preference share scheme must, however, be kept in 
perspective, if such a scheme is to be adopted. 
4.3.4 The Excluded Creditor Scheme 
One way of effectively reducing the amount of the benefit or concession, and particularly the cost 
of negotiating with large body of diverse and dispersed creditors is through Excluded Creditor 
scheme. The Excluded Creditor scheme is favourably adopted when a small number of creditors 
have in terms of value the greatest percentage of claims against the corrtpany24 . Compromise with 
its creditors ("the scheme creditor for a monetary consideration, as acquired from lent to the 
company by the proposer of the scheme. These claims creditors against the company are 
compromised and fully discharged in return for payment from the capital sum and in addition, on 
occasion from proceeds of sale of certain assets of the company); but the claims of the excluded 
creditors are dealt independently of the scheme by way of a separate agreement of cession 
between the creditor and the proposer of the scheme and to which the company is not a party. The 
claims of the excluded creditors are ceded to the proposer as against payment of monetary 
dividend which is usually the same as that paid to the company to the scheme creditor. As the face 
value of the ceded claims of all creditors against the company, the compromise with the scheme 
creditor is relatively small. 
Consequently it is only by the relatively small amount in value of the compromise with the scheme 
creditors that assessed loss is reduced in terms s20(1 )(a)(ii). No set-off against the assessed loss 
claims of the excluded creditor, to the proposer, such transaction falling outside the ambit of the 
scheme. The limitation of this scheme from income tax point of view is that not every company 
which is the target of a scheme satisfy the basic premise necessary for tax purposes pursuant to 
s20(1)(a)(ii) (an indeed, for case of negotiation) that the excluded creditors should be few in 
number but constitute a significant majority in value. 
4.3.5 The Development of a New Cape Scheme 
The purport of the New Cape scheme may be conveniently summarised as follows: 
(a) The objective of the New Cape is that the capital sum provided by the proposer (by way of 
a loan) top the company to enable it to compromise the claims of creditors for a monetary 
consideration, such claims upon sanction being deemed ceded to the proposer. The liability of the 
company on sanction (namely; its liability to proposer for the capital sum advanced and the ceded 
claims) are subordinated so that the company will, in the practical sense, be solvent, and in a 
position to continue trading as a going concern25 . 
4.3.6 The Debenture Scheme 
(a) the Debenture scheme satisfies the jurisdictional requirements of s31 l in that it constitues an 
arrangement between the company and its creditors. 
(B) it is tax efficient from the point of view of preserving any assesed los of a company, subject 
of course to s103(2) 
(c) the subordination of the debentures (and if necessary, the capital sum) resolves the issue of 
the reluctance of courts to discharge on insolvent company from winding-up26. 
It must respects the New Cape Scheme and the Debenture scheme appear to be tax efficient. 
4.4 Summary 
At present, the most significant limitation on the set-off of assesses loss is contained in section 
20(1)(a)(ii). In order to derive maximum benfit of section 311 machinery, the proposer must 
ensure that the compromise benefit is kept at an absolute. In short, the proposer wishes go ahead 
with a standard scheme or any other schemes it more likely than not that the company's assessed 
loss or balance of assessed loss will remain largely intact. Barring Commissioner's counter attack 
in terms of 103(2), the acquirer will obtain considerable tax benefit. 
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CHAPTERS 
TRAFFICKING IN ASSESSED LOSSES OF COMPANIES 
5.1 Introduction 
Final provision dealing with allowability of assessed losses is contained in section 103(2). The 
rationale for the existence of this provision is neither far to seek nor difficult to comprehend. 
Section 103(2) is specifically directed at combatting schemes involving the utilisation of 
companies' assessed losses. It is settled law that section 103(2) should be construed so as to 
advance the remedy provided by the anti-trafficking provision and suppress the mischief which 
the section is directed. The basic lesson seem inescapable: trafficking in assessed losses of 
acquired companies can be costly exercise as ably demonstrated by the Conshu1 case. It is 
char, therefore, that the beneficial use of section 311 machinery is also constrained by the 
anti-avoidance provisions of section 103(2) 
The fuller implications of invocation of section 103(2) will receive closer examination as wells 
as the Conshu case. 
5.2 Basic Provision of Section 103(2) provides that whenever 
"the Commissioner is satisfied that any agreement affecting any company. as a direct or 
indirect result of which income has been received by or has accrued to that company during 
any year of assessment; has at any time before or after the commencement of the Income Tax 
A ·t 55 of 1946, been entered into or effected by any person solely or mainly for the purpose 
of utilizing any assessed loss incurred by the company, in order to avoid liability on the part 
of any tax, duty or levy on income, or to reduce the amount thereof the set-off of any such 
assessed loss or balance of assessed loss against any such income shall be disallowed'. (my 
underlining). 
The section further provides that: 
"any decision of the commissioner under subsection- (2) ... shall be subject to objection and 
appeal, and whenever in proceedings relating thereto it is proved that the ........ agreement or 
change in shareholding in question would result in the payment of any tax, duty or levy 
imposed by this Act or any previous Income Tax Act or an other law administered by the 
Commissioner, or in the reduction of the amount thereof. it shall be presumed, until the 
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contrary is proved -
(a) ............................................ .. 
(b) in the case of any such agreement or change in shareholding, that it has been entered into 
or effected solely or mainly for the purpose of utilizing the assessed loss or balance of 
assessed loss in question in order to avoid or postpone such liability or to reduce the amount 
thereof" 
It is to be noted that " while subsection ( 4) of s 103 places the onus on the taxpayer to prove 
that the agreement or change in the shareholding was not effected solely or mainly to avoid 
tax, it is submitted that where evidence is adduced which shows that there was some reason, 
equally weighty with that of tax avoidance, for entering the transaction, the assessed loss must 
not denied to the taxpayer. By contrast, where section 103(2) is in issue, the taxpayer has the 
greater burden of proving that tax avoidance was ancillary purpose and this is much difficult 
task. In nutshell the application of section 103(2) results in the disallowance of the set-off of 
any such assessed loss or balance of assessed loss 'against any such income"2. 
5.3 Mechanics of Section 103(2) 
5.3.1 Meaning of Solely or Mainly" 
The major obstacle from the taxpayer's point of view in rebutting any attack by the 
commissioner under this section would seem to be the onus of proving that the change in share 
holding was not "solely or mainly" for the purpose of utilizing any assessed loss or balance of 
assessed loss. If the taxpayer can show that he had good reasons for entering into the 
agreement or effecting the change in shareholding, and the use of the assessed loss was a 
subsidiary reason or one that weighed equally with other reasons, the set-off of the assessed 
loss cannot be disallowed3. 
The provisions of section 103(2) are also are littered with expressions which cannot be 
construed with any measure of certainty. One example is the phrase "solely or mainly". Little if 
any difficulty should be experienced in establishing whether activities have been undertaken or 
carried out "solely" for some particular purpose, but "mainly" implies a measure of degree on 
which opinions may frequently differ. 
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The meaning of "mainly" is not defined in the Act. The word is defined in the Oxford 
Dictionary as meaning "for the most part, chiefly "and chiefly" is defined as "above all, but not 
exdusive". 
These two definitions provide limited guidance as to the meaning of the word "mainly", and 
unfortunately there are very few -reported cases in the application of sl03(2). The test to be 
applied in determining the purpose for which the agreement is entered into would, after 
consideration of all the relevant facts, be a subjective one4 . It must therefore be established 
what the parties to the agreement had in mind. The subjective test would seem to be aimed not 
only at determining the sole or main purpose of the agreement but also establish what assessed 
loss the parties had in mind at the time - what assessed loss was contemplated or envisaged in 
the agreement. For instance, the assessed loss in question can be identified in the relevant 
agreement itself or during the negotiations leading to the agreement. 
Guidance can be obtained from ITC 983 5. In this instance the appellant company had incurred 
large trading losses and eventually closed down its business of clothing manufacture. 
Following a change in shareholding the business was recommenc~d on a cut, make and tum 
basis for the purchaser company at a fixed price per garment. The commissioner disallowed 
the set-off brought forward purporting to act in terms of s90(b ). The purchaser company 
contended that it had acquired the appellant company as it was having difficulties in producing 
sufficient clothing to fulfill orders, and the appellant would provide an additional source of 
supply. The witness for the appellant admitted that the assessed loss was used as a bargaining 
factor by the sellers, and it did play some part in inducing the purchaser company to enter into 
agreement, but the main reason for doing so was to obtain a ready-made factory in which 
production could be commenced immediately 
Furthermore, the purchaser company was able to show that subsequent to the acquisition of 
the appellant company, its own turnover and profit had increased and there was no evidence 
that it had diverted income to the appellant company. Watermeyer J (as he then was) was 
satisfied that although the avoidance or reductions of the tax was one of the purpose it was 
not the main purpose. A similar decision, which seems to be based on close reasoning, was by 
the Special Court in ITC6 989. The court again looked to the results achieved by the 
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purchasing company and appellant company. The purchaser company had in fact diverted 
some of its profits to the appellant by selling by selling to the appellant, but at the same price 
as it charged to other merchants. Looked at from a group point of view, the profits of the 
appellant together with those of the purchaser would have achieved on its own. From this, the 
court held that the avoidance of liability for tax was not the sole or main purpose of change in 
shareholding, but rather there were good commercial reasons for the appellant being acquired 
by the purchaser. 
In any dispute involving the application of sl03(2), the full facts will have to be carefully 
examined. These facts will have to include the reputed purpose of the change in share holding 
the assets of the company, whether tangible/ intangible, as of the change-over date, and the 
subsequent activities of the company. The following observation has been made by EB 
Broomberg Tax Strategy 2ed (1983): 
"whenever, in section 103(2) cases, the taxpayer failed to discharge the onus of proving a non-
tax purpose for the transaction, there has often as not, been one tell-tale sign, namely, the 
purchase consideration payable by the taxpayer for the shares in the assessed loss company. If 
it appears that a taxpayer has paid more for the shares in the assessed loss company than they 
are worth, if regard is had exclusively to the net asset value of the company, or its income-
earning potential, then the taxpayer would probably be well advised not to prosecute an appeal 
against a decision by the Commissioner to invoke the provisions of s 103(2) unless he can 
show, some other way, the extra payment was not intended to pay for the tax benefit of the 
assessed loss"7. 
5.3.2 Meaning of "any company" 
The ambit of s 103(2) would appear to be very wide on interpretation of the wording: 
"any change in the share holding in any company" 
In sense, therefore, the foundation for unrestrained application of s103(2) to "any agreement" 
affecting the company or "change in the shareholding" had already been laid. A stronger 
pointer as to the ambit of s I 03 is provided by Glen Anil Development Corporation Ltd, 8 
where Botha JA held that where a change in shareholding in a holding company has resulted in 
income being received by a subsidiary; section 103(2) can be invoked against the subsidiary. 
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Provided that there is no necessary link between the receipt of income by a company and the 
change in shareholding of the other company; s103(2) can be applied. It is a considered view 
that a change in shareholding of a company can only result in an application of the anti-
trafficking provision to the income of another company if the two companies are related. 
The word 'agreement' in s103(2) connotes a contract, that is to say, an agreement which is 
legally binds and enforceable between the parties. All this appears expressly recognised by 
Nicholas AJA in Ocean Manufacturing Ltd9. It is clear law that the words 'any agreement 
affecting any company' in s103(2) could not be restricted to agreements affecting the control 
of the company or affecting any person's right to participate in the profits or dividends of the 
company. There was nothing to suggest that the word 'any' was used in a limited sense. 
In short, the court held that the section was applicable where there was no change in 
shareholding of the taxpayer company but an agreement was entered into whereby an existing 
business that was conducted by the shareholders of the company with an assessed loss was 
s61d to the latter company in order to utilise its assessed loss for tax purpose. 
Tax planning implications are clear: where shares are bought in or an agreement entered into 
with a company which has an assessed loss, it is important that the company retain pre-
existing assets which continue to produce 'untainted' income'0. 
5.4 Discerning Tax Avoidance 
In the wake of a change in shareholding, the new owners could direct the company along one 
or more of the following course of action: 
(I) Start new business in the company. 
(ii) Revive the existing business. 
(ii) Re-direct income to the company. 
(iv) Combination of the above. 
The possible application of s103(2) to each of the above situations is discussed below. 
5. 4. 1 Start new business 
The application of s 103(2) would appear to have been broaden by the decision in ITC 1123 ", 
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where it was heid that the ant-trafficking provision can be applied not only to income diverted 
from another person to the company, but also to income produced by the company's own 
activities. The facts in that case were briefly that a taxpayer, R had acquired the entire share 
capital in the appellant company at a time when the company had no finance, no assets, no 
liabilities, no business and no loss. R immediately initiated a business in the company by 
arranging certain transactions with the companies under his control in return for commission. 
In addition, transactions were entered into with outside parties which produced profits from 
the buying and selling of money at interest and the discounting of bills. The appellant conceded 
that the set-off of the assessed loss against the income derived from the first type of 
transaction was correctly disallowed by the Secretary under s103(2), for it was income 
diverted to the company by R from the other companies. It was conceded, however, that the 
set-off should have been allowed in respect of the income derived from transactions with 
outside parties as this was income not diverted from another company. 
Trollip J, the President of the Special Court, interpreted s103(2) as follows: 
"that the section was intended to apply where income was diverted from another person to a 
company in order to avoid liability for tax on the part of the person is clear from its very 
language. But its wording is wide and there is no warrant/or limiting its application to such 
cases. It refers in the first place to "income ......... received by or ....... accrued to that 
cr,;,tnpany during any year of assessment ... That is wide enough to include income produced 
by its own activities in contradistinction to income diverted to it. Secondly, the section speaks 
of avoiding liability for tax (on the part of. ....... only other person, that shows that only 
diverted income but income produced by the company's own activities can fall within the 
ambit of the section if its other requirements are ful.filled' 12. 
Trollip J further emphasised that the company had no business at the time of the change in 
shareholding. The company was merely a "shell" and only as a direct or indirect result of the 
change in share holding did the income accrue to the company. The appellant, on whom the 
onus rested, had failed to prove that the utilisation of the assessed loss was not his sole or 
main purpose in acquiring the shares and the appeal was accordingly dismissed. While 
accepting that the invocation of s103(2) had the effect of encompassing the acquisition of a 
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corporate loss shell with sizeable balance of assessed loss, it is submitted that the onus 
imposed on the purchasing company by the s103(4) can be successfully discharged. This is 
especially so in the case of a dormant company might have certain trade rights or well known 
trade name and the acquisition of these could be regarded as the main purpose. 
5.4.2 Revive existing business 
It is submitted that where a trading company with a large assessed loss, incurred because of 
the business being unsuccessful, is acquired and the new shareholders do nothing more than 
reorganise the existing business of the company, and return the company to a profitable 
situation, in appropriate circumstances may trigger the application of s 103(2). 
This was nicely illustrated in Ocean Manufacturing Ltd 13 where the court held that the section 
was applicable where there was no change in shareholding of the taxpayer company, but an 
agreement was entered into whereby an existing business that was conducted by the 
shareholders of the with an assessed loss was sold to the latter company in order to utilise its 
assessed loss for tax purpose. In casu two agreements had been concluded, the merger 
agreement concluded in October 1980 and the transfer agreement in July 1981. B had not been 
a party to the merger agreement providing for the reverse takeover of A, but only to the 
transfer agreement whereby C's business was transferred to B. 
Similarly in ITC14 1388 three appeals involving the same parties were all heard as one case. 
The first appeal involved the purchase of a company by the taxpayer and his wife. The 
company had an assessed loss that the commissioner refused to allow to be carried forward to 
be set-off against later profits, on the grounds that s103(2) applied. The taxpayer was able to 
produce sufficient evidence to convince the court that the transaction had not been entered 
into in order to avoid or postpone only liability to tax. In fact, when he bought the shares he 
was unaware that an assessed loss existed, since it had not been mentioned in the negotiations, 
purchase of the company's outstanding book debts. Only at the end of the negotiations was it 
suggested that, since the company enjoyed some goodwill in the area in which it was trading, 
than only the book debts. 
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The taxpayer argued that s103(2) could not apply since the change in share holding did not 
result in a diversion of funds into the company from outside, and its increased profitability was 
entirely due his and his wife's efforts. Although he succeeded in his appeal, this argument did 
not find favour with the court. It held that s103(2) did not only apply when income is diverted 
into the company after a change in share holding brings about revitalizing and resuscitation of 
the company. In adopting this approach Eksteen J followed Trollip in ITC 1123, in which an 
individual acquired control of a company with a large balance of assessed loss he diverted 
income from other sources to this company and at the time caused the company to commence 
earning afresh on its own behalf. While counsel for the company was prepared to concede that 
the diverted income was wholly taxable, he argued that the assessed loss ought to be set-off 
against the remaining income. Trollip J, however, was of the firm opinion that s103(2) was 
drawn broadly enough to catch both types ofincome. He said: 
"Otherwise, to take a clean example, the income from a new and unrelated types of business 
started by the new shareholders of the company, that having acquired the shares solely or 
mainly for tax avoidance, would escape liability for tax on such income by its being set-off 
against the assessed loss produced by the discontinues business of the company under 
/ 
erstwhile shareholders'15 . 
The second appeal in ITC 1388 was conducted along similar lines to the first. Again the 
taxpayer and his wife had brought the company in order to obtain its book debts. In this 
transaction, however, the company had not been trading for in a number of years, and balance 
sheets and profits and loss accounts were available showing the existence and extent of the 
assessed loss. The taxpayer was unable to convince the court that the transaction did not all 
within the ambit of sl03(2), and his appeal failed. 
Eksteen J extracted the main features of s103(2) stating that any assessed loss must be 
disallowed by the commissioner ifhe is satisfied: 
"(a) that any agreement has been concluded affecting any company, or that a change in share 
holding of company has taken place; 
(b) that as direct/indirect result thereof income has been received by or accrued to that 
company during the year of assessment, and change in shareholding effected solely or mainly 
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for the purpose of utilising any assessed loss incurred by the company in order to avoid 
liability on the part of the company or any other person for the payment of income tax"16. 
Although most of the cases referred here were decided in against the Commissioner, there 
have been other cases in which the taxpayer was unable to show that the utilization of an 
assessed loss was not its sole or main purpose in effecting an agreement or change in share 
holding. It follows that the facts of each case have to be carefully examined in order to 
ascertain whether s103(2) can be successfully applied to disallow the set-off of an assessed 
loss. 
5.4.3 Re-direct income to the company 
This type of situation would at first appear to fall squarely into the ambit of s103(2). However, 
situations could arise where although income has been re-directed to the company, it could 
have been arranged for a good commercial reason unrelated to tax avoidance. In such a 
situation the company could successfully discharge the onus of proving that the change in 
shareholding was not "solely or mainly" for the purpose of utilizing the assessed loss. 
The Special Court in ITC17 1347 dealt with the acquisition of the shares in a clothing 
manufacturing concern with an assessed loss by a company in same line of business. By way of 
background after experiencing financial difficulties the company was placed in provisional 
liquidation until an offer of compromise sanctioned in terms of section 311 of the Companies 
Act 61 of 1973. Thereafter the company was discharged from provisional liquidation. The 
Commissioner acting in terms of s 103(2) disallowed the balance of assessed loss to be carried 
forward from 197 5 on the ground that the shares of the taxpayer had been acquired solely or 
mainly for the purpose of using the assessed loss for the set-off against income that might 
accrue to the taxpayer. 
Smallberger J (as he then was) found that the shares were not acquired solely or mainly for the 
purpose of using the assessed loss. So far as material, the taxpayer had assets of value 
including trade marks and import permits. There were practical reasons unconnected with 
assessed loss fro acquiring the shares of the taxpayer18. As evident from the facts the head 
been no diversion of income from B to the taxpayer despite the fact that subsequently, due to 
economic factors, the taxpayer's production was moved from D to C (where B's 
manufacturing plant was situated) and the taxpayer became a distributor of products 
manufactured by Busing the taxpayer's plant machinery (for which rental was derived by the 
taxpayer). 
5 .4 .4 Combination of the above 
A combination of the aforementioned factors will surely trigger the application of section 
103(2) unless there is compelling evidence to the contrary. 
5.5 Trafficking in Assessed Losses of Companies After Conshu 
Can companies assessed losses still be utilized? "That is the question now being asked in the 
offices of accountant and lawyers and chambers of many of the advocates at the Bar since the 
pronouncement of the Appellate Division in deciding Conshu. This decision was to the effect 
the commissioner is not limited to invoke s103(2) only in respect of the tax year in which the 
relevant agreement is concluded or the change in share holding effected: he must wait for an 
attempted set-off by the taxpayer under s20 against tainted income. 
The facts of the case are important. The taxpayer ( C ) suffered an assessed loss of R3. 3 
million during its tax year ending on 30 June 1984. After taking into account its accumulated 
assessed loss brought forward from its previous tax year, the Commissioner determined its 
new balance of assessed loss at approximately R5,9 million. During the tax year its trading 
results deteriorated further. Pressure from bankers forced it to take drastic step towards the 
end of that year. They involved, inter alia, a change in its shareholding, the disposal of the 
bulk of its business, and the acquisition, on the last day of the tax year, of all trading assets and 
liabilities of another company. In its return for the 1985 tax year reflected the effect of the 
disposal of its business and the acquisition of the new trading assets and liabilities. The 
assessed loss for 1985 was added to the accumulated loss of R5,9 million brought forward 
from 1984. The assessed loss at the end of 1985 carried forward to the 1986 tax year came to 
some R9,9 million. The changes made to its business during 1985 produced taxable income of 
about R6,5 million for the 1986 tax year. C sought to utilize s20 during 1986 by setting off the 
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assessed loss ofR9 million brought forward from 1985 against taxable income ofR6,5 million 
for 1986. The Commissioner initially allowed this set-off But he invoked s103(2) and stated 
that he was satisfied that the transaction whereby C had acquired the new trading assets had 
been entered solely or mainly to postpone its liability for the payment of income tax. He 
accordingly ruled that C was not allowed to utilize the accumulated assessed loss brought 
forward from 1985 against the income derived during 1986 from the assets acquired during 
198519. 
Swart G J states as follows in regard to the minority reasoning as to the moment of application 
of section 103(2): 
The conflicting majority and minority views in Coshu lead to entirely different results. The 
absence of tainted income ( that, income received or acrued as a direct or indirect result of the 
relevant agreement or change in shareholding) during the tax year in which the agreement is 
concluded and takes effect will, in the minority view, place the taxpayer beyond the reach of 
s 103(2), as this provision can be invoked only in that tax year and in no other. But the 
minority expressely refrained from considering the position should an agreement be concluded 
in one year but only take effect in a later year (supra at 615n). Section 103(2) can, according 
to the minority view be applied only to the assessed loss for the year before the one in which 
the agreement is concluded, since that is the assessed loss at the time whens 103(2) should be 
invoked"20. 
The implications of the majority view for the schemes involving the utilisation of corporate 
loss shell's accumulated assessed loss are significant: Section 103 is to be invoked in respect 
of the tax year in which the company tries to set-off assessed loss against tainted income for 
the first time, irrespective of whether the relevant agreement or change in shreholding was 
effected in that or an earlier year. It is submitted, correctly, that the majority approach as to 
the moment of application of the anti- trafficking provision is in complete harmony with the 
intention of Parliament as inferring from the nature of the remedy contained in section 103(2). 
In reaching a decision adverse to the taxpayer, Harms JA concluded that because the 
Commissioner could not have done applied s103(20 to the 1985 year entailed that the 
Commissioner is precluded from doing so in respect of 1986 would be destructive of the 
p11rpose of the provision.21 The court found that, the Special Court had been correct in finding 
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that it was competent for the Commissioner to apply s 103(2) for the first time in relation to 
the 1986 tax year. 
More helpful, in my opinion, is the submission by TS Emslie (Some Thoughts on Conshu): 
"It seems that a good case can be made for the need to enact amending legislation to clarify 
the interpretation ofboth s 103(2) ands 20(1), and possibly also s 22(1) and (2) of the Act in 
the light of the difference of judicial opinion in Conshu. Alternatively, a practice to be adopted 
in the face of conflicting judgements in Conshu would seem to be called for"22. 
It is the submission of the writer that, the decision in Conshu may be said to constitute a 
further deterrent to trafficking in assessed losses of companies. 
5.6 Summary 
The major watershed highlighted by the foregoing discussion is between diametrically opposed 
judicial views expressed in Conshu as to tax year in respect of which the Commissioner is 
entitled to invoke section 103(2). It is now clear law that the Commissioner is empowered to 
invoke the anti-avoidance provisions contained in section 103(2) in a tax year subsequent to 
that which the relevant agreement was concluded or the change in shareholding occurred. 
The anti-trafficking provisions would appear to have little effect on the utilisation of acquired 
companies' accumulated assessed losses to generate tax s~eltered income. The re-directing of 
income from one company to another remains endemic in practice and particularly so in- group 
situations where there are many subsidiaries. It would seem that provided that there is a 
commercial reason unconnected to tax avoidance, for the purchase of a company with an 
assessed loss, section 103(2) could not be applied. 
Ti1e anti-trafficking provisions contained in sections 103(2) form an important arsenal in the 
Commissioner's litigation strategy and crackdown against tax avoidance schemes. Equally 
important, the Commissioner's attack on such schemes is not limited to the provisions of 
section 103(2), but could in appropriate circumstances resort the main anti-avoidance 
provision contained in section 103(1 ). 
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CHAPTER6 
SECTION 311 SCHEMES USEFUL TAX DEVICE DESPITE REVENUE 
CRACKDOWN 
6.1 An Overview 
The overall thrust of this paper should be now clear. The leitmotif behind s 311 schemes of 
arrangements and compromise is the assessed loss carry forwards. And there are innovative 
techniques to preserve assessed loss, thereby ensuring beneficial use of s3 l l machinery. 
Assessed loss is a unique asset for tax planning purposes, because its value greatly appreciates as 
it generates tax-sheltered income in subsequent years until it is fully exhausted. The tax-sheltered 
income represents a kind of incentive and an assessed loss an alluring commodity. This quality can 
be a two-edged sword, depending on how s 311 scheme is structured and the likelihood of Inland 
Revenue's counter-attack. 
· 6.2 Section 311 Schemes can be a Tax-efficient too, but there are still points to watch 
Two of the more serious pitfalls for the utilization of company's assessed losses are: 
Sections 20(1) and 20(l)(a)(ii) which set forth the package elements that must be complied with 
for the allowability of assessed loss. First, the taxpayer's activities must constitute carrying on 
trade as envisaged by s20(1), in order to avoid sterilization of assessed loss, Also, the trade need 
not be carried throughout the year. A company which carries on no trade at all during a tax year 
forfeits any assessed loss brought forward from a prior year, as the continuity implied by s20(1) 
is irretrievably broken. 
The other limb of s20, is s20(l)(a)(ii), the taxpayer has to establish the absence of one/more of 
the following: 
1. A concession granted by or compromise with the company's creditors 
2. The receipt by or accrual to the company of a benefit from para 1. 
The application of this provision could result in the obliteration of company's assessed loss. 
Significantly, tax planning objectives of s3 l l schemes are directed at mitigating the application 
of s20(l)(a)(ii) .. 
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Section 103(2) is the last basic weapon in the arsenal of the commissioner seeking to halt 
trafficking in assessed losses of companies. The application of s103(2) will result in the 
disallowance of the attempted set-off assessed loss against any year of assessment as a direct or 
indirect result of the relevant agreement or change in shareholding ("tainted income"). The 
dominant view in Conshu now taken as settled law, that the Commissioner is not limited to 
invoke s103(2) only in respect of the tax year in which the relevant agreement is concluded or the 
change in shareholding is effected: he must wait for an attempted set-off by the taxpayer under 
s20 against tainted income. Consequently, s103(2) therefore is to be invoked in respect of the tax 
year in which the company tries to set-off an assessed loss against tainted income for the first 
time, irrespective of whether the relevant agreement or change in shareholding was effected at an 
earlier year. 
Trafficking in assessed losses is still lawful, still profitable, and, if anything more attractive now 
than it was. The severe limitations now applicable to Conshu as a result of the Appellate Divisions 
conflicting judgements -all of which have highlighted the need to enact amending legislation to 
clarify the interpretation of both s103(2), and possibly also s22(1) and (2) of the Act. Avoiders 
and planners will no doubt wish to resuscitate their practices as soon as possible. 
6.3 Summary and concluding remarks 
It is frequently stated that the system of taxation in South Africa is harsh and inflexible while this 
may be true on a strict reading of the law, it is hoped that the foregoing will serve to demonstrate 
that, in practice, the impact of direct taxation can be and frequently is mitigated by reliefs and 
concessions. In particular, if a sufficiently large and intact balance of asses loss is concerned, and 
the acquirer consider an insolvent company to be worthy of consideration, he will effect s311 
compromise with creditors. With this in mind, it becomes clear that assessed loss remain the 
d6ving forcef behind schemes of arrangemenst and compromise carried out in terms of s 311 of 
the Companies Act. 
Because the invocation of section 20 in conjunction with s 103(2) will result in the forfeiture or 
sterilization of assessed losses, the best defense is a constant and careful self-review to ensure that 
the scheme is tax efficient. 
Bibliography 
Blackman M S 'Compromises, Arrangements, Reconstructions and Amalgamations', par 56 - 87 
in The Law of South Africa Joubert (ed), Vol 4 Part 3 ('Companies'), First Reissue (1996) 
Broomberg EB Tax Strategy 2ed (1983) 
De Koker AP, Emslie TS & Frame CR Income Tax in South Africa (1988) 
Emslie, Davis & Hutton Income Tax Cases & Materials 2ed ( 19!)5) ~ 
Emslie TS "Some Thoughts on Conshu" (unpublished) The Taxpayer 1995 
Getz K & Jooste RJ 'Section 311 of the Companies Act: Preserving the Assessed Loss' 
Jooste R J 'Compromises and Assessed Losses' 26 Income Tax Reporter (1987) 323 
Jooste RJ 'Schemes of Arrangement - A New Development' 28 Income Tax Reporter (1989) 7 
Revenue Law Jooste (ed) 56, first published as Acta Juridica (1995), Juta & Co. Ltd 
Jooste R J 'Green Light for the Standard Scheme? (1994) 8 Tax Planning 125 
Levin "The Section 31 I Compromise" (1992) Vol 21 BML 125 
Luiz S M & Hambidge E G "Compromise and Personal Liability under Section 424 of the 
Companies Act: Two Judicial Approaches" (1989) 3 SA Mere Lj 123 
Meyerowitz D Meyerowitz On Income Tax 1997/1998 
Meyerowitz D, Spiro E, The Taxpayer's Permanent Volume on Income Tax in South Africa 
Patterson & Edrie Australian Company Law Volll ed 
Silke Aubrey S Tax Avoidance and Tax Reduction Within the Framework of the South African 
Income Tax Legislation with Special Reference to the Effect on the Fiscus and to Current 
Anomalies and Inequities (1958) $165 
Silke J Tax Reporter 1991 "Assessed Loss of Companies" 30 
Spiro E 'Income Tax Deductions -Whether Balance of Assessed Loss Prior to Non-Trading 
Period Thereafter Deductible' (1952) 1 The Taxpayer 213 
Swart G J The Utilization of Assessed Losses by Companies - A Reappraisal After Conshu (Pty) 
Ltd v Commissioner for Inland Revenue (1996) 8 SA Mere L J 119 
Stewart D M "The Prohibition of Tax Avoidance an Evaluation of Section 103(2) of the South 
African Income Tax Act" (1970) 11 CILSA 168 
The Taxpayer 'Company Schemes of Arrangement: Preserving the Assessed Loss' Vol 38 (2) 
(Feb. 1989) 
The Taxpayer 'The Conshu Case' Vol 45 (5) (May 1995) 
Van Dorsten J L "Words & Phrases Judicially considered" 
Williams R C Income Tax in South Africa Law and Practice 
Table of Cases 
Av Commissioner of Taxes 1954 (1) SA 38 (SR) 195 SATC 29 
Blue Moon Investment (Pvt) Ltd v Commissioner of Taxes 1966 (4) SA 205 (RAD) 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Butcher Bros (Pty) Ltd 1945 AD 301, 13 SATC 21 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Louis Zinn Organisation (Pty) Ltd 1958 (4) SA 477 (A), 22 
SATC 85, 1958 Taxpayer 208 
Commissioner oflnland Revenue v Nemojim (Pty) Ltd 1983 (4) SA 935 (A), 45 SATC 241, 
1983 Taxpayer 204 
Commissioner oflnland Revenue v Ocean Manufacturing Ltd 1990 (3) SA 610, 52 SATC 151, 
1990 Taxpayer 147 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Peoples Stores (Walvis Bay) 1990 (2) SA 353 (A), 52 
SATC 9, 1990 Taxpayer 70 
Commissioner oflnland Revenue v Stott 1928 252, 2 SATC 253 
Downs Distribution Co. (Pty) Ltd v Associated Blue Stores (Pty) Ltd, CLR 463 
Ex parte De Villiers and Another NNO: In re Carbon Developments (Pty) Ltd (In Liquidation) 
1993 (1) SA 493 (A) 
m, parte Federate Nywerhede Bpk 1975 (1) SA 126 (W) 
Ex parte Kaplan & Others NNO: In re Robin Consolidated Industries Ltd and Others 1987 (4) 
SA413 (W) 
Ex parte Lomati Landgoed (Edms) Bpk 1985 (2) SA 517 (W) 
Ex parte Millman & Others NNO: In re Multi-bou (Pty) Ltd and Others 1987 (4) SA 405 ( C) 
Ex parte Strydom NO: In re Central Plumbing Works (Natal) (Pty); Ex parte SpendriffNO: 
In re Candida Footwear Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd; Ex parte SpendriffNO: In re Jerseyex (Pty) 
Ltd 1988 (1) SA 616 (D) 
Glen Anil Development Ltd v SIR 1975 (4) SA &15 (A), 37SATC319, 1975 Taxpayer 226 
Kommisaris vanBinne Landse Inkomste v Van der Walt 1986 (4) SA 303, 48 SATC 104, 1986 
Taxpayer 234 
Lockie Bros Ltd v CIR 1922 TPD 42, 32 SATC 150 
Mason v Morton (1986) 1 WLR 1343 (ChD) 
Matla Coal Ltd v CIR 1987 (1) SA 108 (A), 48 SATC 223, 1987 Taxpayer 49 
Namex (Pty) Ltd v CIR 1992 (2) SA 761 ( C) 
Namex (Pty) Ltd v CIR 1994 (4) SA 265 (A) 
New Urban Properties Ltd v SIR 1966 (1) SA 217 (A), 27 SATC 173, 1966 Taxpayer 12 
Re NFU Development Trust Ltd [1973] ALL ER 135 
Robin Consolidated Industries Ltd v CIR [ 1997] 2 All SA 195 ( A) 
SA Bazaars (Pty) Ltd v CIR 1952 (4) SA 505 (A), 18 SATC 240, 1952 Taxpayer 213 
Sackstein NO Bolstone (Free State) (Pty) Ltd (In Liquidation) & Others 1988 (4) SA 616 (0) 
Secretary of Inland Revenue v Guardian Assurance Holdings (SA) Ltd 1976 522 (A), SATC 
111, 1977 Taxpayer 194 
Sovereign Life Assurance Co. V Dodd 1892 2QB 573 
Timberfellers (Pty) Ltd v CIR 1994 (4) SA 153 (A) 
H.W. Lategan v CIR 1926 CPD 203 
ITC 172 (1930) 5 SATC 171 
ITC 664 16 SATC 125 
Special Court Decisions 
ITC 983 25 SATC 55, 1963 Taxpayer 106 
ITC 989 25 SATC 122, 1963 Taxpayer 1116 
ITC 1123 JI SATC 48, 1969 Taxpayer 208 
ITC 1388 (1983) 46 SATC 126 
ITC 1347 44 SATC 33, 1986 Taxpayer 89 
ITC 1476 52 SATC 141, 1995 Taxpayer 53 
ITC 1613 (1997) 59 SATC 63 
Special Court Case No 8558 
